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NOWHERE TO RUN, NOWHERE TO HIDE:*
APPLYING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
CONNECTED CARS IN THE INTERNET-OFTHINGS ERA
BY: GREGORY C. BROWN, JR.†
“Privacy is not an option, and it shouldn’t be
the price we accept for just getting on the Internet.”1

INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are in the market for a new motor vehicle.
Like many first-time car owners, this is your first major capital
purchase. After conducting your own research and looking around
the showroom at the car dealership, you have decided on your
dream vehicle: a car with built-in 4G LTE Internet access.2 Once
you sign all of the required paperwork at the dealer, the new car
is yours. Before you drive off the car lot, you are eager to test out
the car’s hi-tech features. You connect your iPhone to your car to
make calls and access your text messages. Highly satisfied, you
begin your drive home in your new car. For now, all is well.
Several weeks later, your best friend calls you and invites you
over for dinner. You gladly accept. On your way to your friend’s
house, you fail to stop at a stop sign. Unfortunately, a police
cruiser was stationed near the stop sign, and the police officer in
*MARTHA

AND THE VANDELLAS, Nowhere to Run, on DANCE PARTY (Motown 1965).
J.D. 2018, St. John’s University School of Law. Many thanks to Prof. Elaine Chiu and
Rosemary LaSala for their constructive feedback on this Note. I also thank my family for
their unwavering support, especially my mother, Carol Martin Brown.
1
Gary Kovacs, Tracking our Online Trackers, TED (Feb. 2012),
http://www.ted.com/talks/gary_kovacs_tracking_the_trackers/transcript?language=en.
Gary Kovacs is the former Chief Executive Officer of AVG Technologies and Mozilla
Corporation. Id.
2 The 4G LTE connection will allow this vehicle to stream information from the Internet
directly to the vehicle and to create a Wi-Fi hotspot, which allows mobile devices (such as
laptops, tablets, and smartphones) to connect to the Internet by using the vehicle’s Internet
connection. See 4G LTE and Wi-Fi Hotspot, ONSTAR, https://perma.cc/7UJ7-L9M9.
†
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the cruiser had full view of your traffic violation. The police officer
pulls you over soon after.
When the officer approaches your window, she informs you that
you failed to stop at the stop sign several blocks ago. After you
hand the officer your license and registration, the officer notices
you are wearing a baseball cap that has a picture of a marihuana
leaf. The officer then asks if you have been smoking marihuana,
and you quickly answer, “No.” Nonetheless, the officer orders you
out of the car, places you in handcuffs, and conducts an interior
search of your car. The search of the interior returns nothing, so
the officer decides to use your car’s touchscreen display to access
your text messages and call history. The officer then finds the
following text-message exchange between you and a contact
named “Rott”:
You: “How much did u put in the trunk?”
Rott: “850g, you’ll be good for a while”
You: “Got it, thanks”
Through her training and expertise, the officer knew that this
text-message exchange was related to illegal drug activity. As a
result, the officer searched the trunk of your vehicle. In the trunk,
the officer found a small box with seventeen plastic baggies. Each
baggie was tied up and contained approximately fifty grams of
marihuana, with the exception of one baggie, which was opened
and almost empty. With this evidence, the officer places you under
arrest for criminal possession of marihuana.3 In hindsight, maybe
the 1986 Chevrolet Camaro was a better option.
With the rise of Internet-connected vehicles, situations like the
scenario above will become more prevalent. The percentage of new
cars equipped with Internet connectivity will rise to seventy-five
percent by 2020, up from only thirteen percent in 2015.4 These
3 On the federal level, marihuana is considered a Schedule I controlled substance, 21
U.S.C. § 812(c)(10) (2016), and possession of marihuana is a federal crime, 21 U.S.C. § 844
(2016). On the state level, possession of marihuana above certain amounts for nonmedicinal purposes is a crime. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 221.20 (LexisNexis 2016) (stating
that possession of marihuana above eight ounces is a class E felony).
4 Leo Sun, Connected Cars in the Next Decade: 4 Numbers Everyone Should Know, THE
MOTLEY
FOOL
(Mar.
6,
2006,
7:05
PM),
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2016/03/06/connected-cars-in-the-next-decade-4numbers-everyo.aspx.
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Connected Cars5 will account for an estimated 380 million vehicles
on the road by 2021.6 Currently, many cars record speed, direction,
gear settings, and brake usage.7 In the near future, cars will be so
integrated with wireless networks that they will be like giant
rolling smartphones – equipped with calling systems, streaming
video, cameras, and apps capable of harnessing an unprecedented
trove of data that vehicles will produce about themselves and the
people who drive them.8
A recent study by the United States Department of Justice
illustrates the prevalence of vehicle stops and searches by police.
In 2011, more than 21.6 million American drivers aged sixteen or
older were involved in a police-initiated traffic stop, comprising
about 10% of the 212.3 million American drivers aged sixteen or
older.9 About 3.5% of all stopped vehicles were then searched by
police, meaning over 750,000 traffic stops resulted in vehicle
searches in one year.10
Courts have held that a search warrant is not required for a
vehicle search under certain circumstances. For example, an
officer may search a vehicle without a warrant if she has probable
cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband.11
5 Connected Cars are automobiles “that have access to the Internet and [contain] a
variety of sensors, and . . . are thus able to send and receive signals, sense the physical
environment around them, and interact with other vehicles or entities.” Edward H. Baker
et al., PWC STRATEGY &, Connected Car Report 2016: Opportunities, Risk, and Turmoil on
the Road to Autonomous Vehicles, 10 (Robert Verikiel et al. eds., 2016),
http://www.strategyand.pwc.com/media/file/Connected-car-report-2016.pdf.
6 John Greenough, The Connected Car Report: Forecasts, Competing Technologies, and
Leading
Manufacturers,
BUS.
INSIDER
(June
10,
2016,
5:33
PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/connected-car-forecasts-top-manufacturers-leading-carmakers-2015-3.
7 Michelle V. Rafter, Decoding What’s in Your Car’s Black Box, EDMUNDS,
http://www.edmunds.com/car-technology/car-black-box-recorders-capture-crash-data.html
(last updated July 22, 2014).
8 See Baker et al., supra note 5, at 21 (noting that Connected Cars will soon be able to
“provide insights into driving patterns, touch point preferences, digital service usage, and
vehicle condition, in virtually real time.”). Manufacturers can use this data for “preventive
and predictive [car] maintenance, optimized marketing, upselling, and making data
available to third parties.” Id. (emphasis added).
9 Lynn Langton & Matthew Durose, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Police Behavior During
Traffic
and
Street
Stops,
2011,
3
(Sept.
24,
2013),
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pbtss11.pdf (stating that “[a]bout 10% of the 212.3
million U.S. drivers age 16 or older were stopped while operating a motor vehicle during
their most recent contact with police.”).
10 See id. at 9.
11 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925). “Contraband” is defined, infra
note 75.
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However, this automobile exception has traditionally been limited
to the finite space of the physical vehicle itself, such as the trunk12
and glove compartment.13 Since the digital data on a Connected
Car may not be located in the physical car itself, there is a new
legal question in applying the Fourth Amendment to Connected
Cars;14 specifically, whether a warrantless search of the physical
areas of the Car also permits a search of the digital data in the
Car. This Note will answer this question.
Although this Note will focus on Connected Cars, this Note is a
case study symbolic of the Fourth Amendment’s application to
developing technology. The Supreme Court recently applied
Fourth Amendment doctrine to a global positioning system
(hereinafter “GPS”)15 and a cell phone.16 These devices, along with
Connected Cars, are some of the many new devices in the Internet
of Things (hereinafter “IoT”) that can connect to the Internet and
collect and share a wide variety of data.17 The concept of IoT goes
beyond computers, smartphones, and tablets; items that were
traditionally non-electronic are now being equipped with
microchips and various sensors to make the devices more effective
and user-friendly.18 For example, wearable health and fitness
sensors can “track and wirelessly transmit information such as
heart rate, brain activity, body temperature, and hydration level”

12 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 800 (1982) (holding that a warrantless search of
containers in the trunk of a car is permissible).
13 New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that a police officer, incident
to arrest, may search the glove compartment of the occupant’s car).
14 See Andrew G. Ferguson, The Internet of Things and the Fourth Amendment of
Effects, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 805, 853 (2016) (stating that “[i]f an effect is defined as the
physical object, plus the digital information located in the device and the communication
signals to a third-party network, then a whole new Fourth Amendment threshold has been
created without clear boundaries.”).
15 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012). Jones is discussed further in Part II-C
infra.
16 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). Riley is discussed further in Part II-C
infra.
17 See Ferguson, supra note 14, at 812 (“As a general matter, the concept behind the
Internet of Things is quite simple: objects embedded with identifiers or recognizable by
sensors will be able to communicate digital information to sensors seeking to collect the
information.”); See Antigone Peyton, A Litigator’s Guide to the Internet of Things, 22 RICH.
J.L. & TECH. 9 (2016).
18 See Ferguson, supra note 14, at 812, 816; Melanie Swan, Sensor Mania! The Internet
of Things, Wearable Computing, Objective Metrics, and the Quantified Self 2.0, 1 J. SENSOR
& ACTUATOR NETWORKS 217, 218 (2012).
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in real time.19 Similarly, sensors in homes can control, among
other things, the temperature, the amount of light in a room, and
the opening and closing of doors.20 There are even smart
refrigerators that can detect when it is running low on milk and
reorder more online.21 Since IoT technology is still in its infancy,22
courts have not had the opportunity to apply the Fourth
Amendment to these new technologies, including Connected Cars.
As IoT technology continues to evolve, Fourth Amendment
protections also need to evolve in order to maintain the balance of
power between individuals and law enforcement.23 Criminal
investigations are more sophisticated due to advances in
technology.24 If these investigation techniques are left unchecked,
individual Fourth Amendment protections will become less
effective over time.25 To maintain the level of Fourth Amendment
protection intended by the Framers of the Constitution, courts
need to respond with legal rules that will protect the balance of
power between individuals and law enforcement.26 These legal
rules do not expand Fourth Amendment protections beyond their
intended scope; these protections only serve to maintain the
constitutionally mandated balance of police power.27
This Note advocates that the United States Supreme Court
impose a search warrant requirement for the digital data on a

19 Ferguson, supra note 14, at 817 n.75.
20 Id. at 817.
21 Peter McOwan & Louis McCallum, When Fridges Attack: The New Ethics of the

Internet of Things, THE GUARDIAN: SCI. BLOG NETWORK (Sept. 8, 2014, 2:00 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/science/alexs-adventures-in-numberland/2014/sep/08/whenfridges-attack-the-new-ethics-of-the-internet-of-things.
22 Id.
23 See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 125
HARV. L. REV. 476, 527 (2011) (describing equilibrium-adjustment theory as a “mechanism
by which the Fourth Amendment maintains balance over time”).
24 See id.; Michael Casey, Police Radars That Can See Through Walls Worry Privacy
Advocates, CBS NEWS (Jan. 20, 2015, 4:43 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/policeradars-range-r-that-can-see-through-walls-worry-privacy-advocates/ (describing a new law
enforcement device that can “see through most building materials up to 12 inches thick and
can detect a person’s breathing from 50 feet away”).
25 See Kerr, supra note 23, at 527 (opining that “if a new technology permits the
government to access information that it previously could not access without a warrant,
using techniques not regulated under preexisting rules that predate that technology, the
effect will be that the Fourth Amendment matters less and less over time”).
26 Id. at 482.
27 See id. at 527.

BROWN - MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

316

JRNL OF CIVIL RIGHTS & ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

2/6/19 4:32 PM

[Vol. 32:3

Connected Car.28 For purposes of police searches, the Court should
bifurcate the physical areas and the digital data on Connected
Cars. This bifurcation will properly account for the greater
individual privacy interests implicated in a search of digital
information, as detailed in the Supreme Court decision Riley v.
California,29 where the Supreme Court held that police are
required to obtain a warrant prior to searching digital data on a
cell phone.30 The massive trove of data located on a Connected Car
is virtually similar, if not greater, to that of a cell phone.31
Consequently, the Court’s rationales in Riley should be extended
to these Cars in order to maintain the balance of power between
individuals and law enforcement.
Part I of this Note will briefly discuss the key components of a
Connected Car, identify who collects the data from the Car, and
examine the various uses for the data. Part I also explores
whether Car owners consent to the collection of their Car’s data.
Part II-A will trace the historical development of the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment, which generally permits lawenforcement officers to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle.
Part II-B will discuss how the Supreme Court has applied the
Fourth Amendment to pre-Internet technologies. Part II-C will
discuss two recent Fourth Amendment Supreme Court cases,
United States v. Jones32 and Riley v. California, that involve a
Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device and a cell phone,
respectively. Part III-A recommends that a warrant be required
for the search of digital data on a Connected Car, which serves to
protect the Car owner’s individual privacy interests. Part III-B
addresses possible concerns about the efficacy and practicality of
a warrant requirement. This Note concludes in Part IV.

28 Remarkably, a New York Assistant District Attorney, who wished to remain
anonymous, agreed that a warrant should be obtained before searching digital data on a
Connected Car. Telephone Interview with Assistant District Attorney, New York (Feb. 16,
2017).
29 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014).
30 Id. at 2495.
31 Edward J. Markey, Tracking & Hacking: Security & Privacy Gaps Put American
Drivers at Risk, U.S. SENATOR ED MARKEY OF MASS., at 8 (Feb. 9, 2015),
https://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2015-02-06_MarkeyReportTracking_Hacking_CarSecurity%202.pdf.
32 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402-04 (2012).
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I. WHAT IS A CONNECTED CAR?
Connected Cars will provide manufacturers with a level of
insight into their customers that they have never had before.33
Connected Cars contain several categories of data collection.34
First, the Car records geographic location in several ways.35
Navigation systems in the Car record the Car’s physical location,
the last location where the Car was parked, and “previous
destinations entered into [the] navigation system.”36 Second, the
Car records operational data, including vehicle speed, travel
direction, and times and distances traveled.37 Finally, the Car
records various miscellaneous events, including potential crash
events (sudden changes in speed), seat belt use, and air bag
deployment.38 All of this data is stored locally on the Car or
transmitted to the manufacturer.39
Aside from data collection, cell phone integration allows certain
data on the cell phone to be accessed through the Car’s head unit.40
Apple CarPlay41 and Android Auto42 are two examples of headunit software that allow this cell phone connectivity. While the
user only has access to certain cell phone information through the

33 See Baker et al., supra note 5, at 21 (noting that “[t]he auto industry has not had the
frequent digital touch points to be able to” use the data collected from customers).
34 Markey, supra note 31, at 8; see also Andreas Habeck et al., Connected Car,
Automotive Value Chain Unbound, MCKINSEY & COMPANY, at 47 (Sept. 2014),
http://www.sas.com/images/landingpage/docs/3_McKinsey_John_Newman_Connected_Car
_Report.pdf.
35 Markey, supra note 31, at 8.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 10. Local storage is done on a special hard drive, and a typical hard drive can
hold between 100 gigabytes and 320 gigabytes of data. See, e.g., MQ01AAD***C Series,
TOSHIBA,
http://toshiba.semicon-storage.com/ap-en/product/storageproducts/specialty/mq01aadxxxc.html (hereinafter “Toshiba”).
40 See Habeck et al., supra note 34, at 47. A head unit is “[t]he central control unit for
a vehicles entertainment system.” Alphabetical Glossary of Automotive Terms, EDMUNDS,
https://www.edmunds.com/glossary/.
41 Available on select cars, Apple CarPlay allows iPhone users to access certain features
on their iPhone while driving. CarPlay users can, among other things, “get directions, make
calls, send and receive [text] messages, and listen to music” by using a touchscreen display,
buttons on a car’s display, or buttons on their steering wheel. iOS - CarPlay, APPLE ,
http://www.apple.com/ios/carplay/.
42 Android Auto is the corollary to Apple CarPlay for Android smartphones. See
Android Auto, ANDROID, https://www.android.com/auto/.
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head-unit software,43 the Car itself has access to much more.44 For
example, Apple CarPlay “can predict where you most likely want
to go using addresses from your email, texts, contacts, and
calendars.”45 Consider this scenario: You send a text message to
your friend, Jane Doe, to meet you at Utopia Pizzeria. You then
decide to drive your Connected Car, with Apple CarPlay, to Utopia
Pizzeria. When you connect your cell phone to your Car, the
navigation system immediately suggests Utopia Pizzeria as your
next destination. Assuming you have never been to Utopia
Pizzeria, the Car would not know that you want to visit Utopia
Pizzeria if it did not have access to your text message to Jane Doe.
The requisite privacy statements for Connected Car services
detail the collection and sharing of the Car data. For example,
OnStar – a multi-purpose Connected Car system with more than
seven million subscribers in North America and China46– remotely
collects and stores the Car data mentioned earlier.47 Under the
terms of OnStar’s privacy statement, OnStar may use the Car’s
data “for any purpose,”48 so long as they anonymize it to no longer
reasonably identify the Car’s owner or the Car itself; this permits
OnStar to share the Car data with marketing companies and other
third parties.49
Under certain circumstances, the privacy statements permit
data to be shared with law enforcement. To retrieve data from
OnStar that is traceable to a specific vehicle, police would need to
obtain a warrant, subpoena, or court order.50 OnStar and other
similar systems have already received requests for this data from
law enforcement.51 These requests predate the development of
43
44
45
46

See iOS - CarPlay, supra note 41.
See id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Stefan Cross, OnStar Tops 1 Billion Customer Interactions, BUICK (July 29, 2015),
http://media.buick.com/media/us/en/gm/news.detail.html/content/Pages/news/us/en/2015/j
ul/0729_onstar.html.
47 Privacy Statement, ONSTAR, https://www.onstar.com/us/en/footer-links/privacypolicy.html; see also Markey, supra note 31, at 10.
48 See Privacy Statement, supra note 47.
49 Id.
50 Id. OnStar refuses to release the number of tracking requests they receive from
police. See Thomas Fox-Brewster, Cartapping: How Feds Have Spied On Connected Cars
For
15
Years,
FORBES
(Jan.
15,
2017,
1:10
PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/thomasbrewster/2017/01/15/police-spying-on-carconversations-location-siriusxm-gm-chevrolet-toyota-privacy/.
51 Fox-Brewster, supra note 50.
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Connected Car systems, but they center around the same legal
issues. For example, in 2009, Louisiana police obtained a warrant
to compel OnStar to track a vehicle travelling from Texas to
Louisiana.52 OnStar complied, and the police found ecstasy,
cocaine, and a gun inside the vehicle.53 Moreover, if an OnStar
subscriber cancels their service, OnStar will continue to collect the
Car’s data unless the Car owner specifically opts out of the data
collection.54
Consumers grant manufacturers the permission to access and
collect this data through their agreements to the manufacturer’s
privacy statements; still, these agreements do not represent true
consent.55 If manufacturers disclose in their privacy statement
that they are collecting and sharing a Car owner’s data, then
owners are deemed to have expressly consented to the
manufacturers’ policies.56 Also, if a Car owner chooses to cease the
manufacturer’s data collection, they are usually prohibited from
using some of the Car’s valuable functionalities, such as GPS.57 To
provide more transparency, some critics have advocated for an
“affirmative consent”58 principle where the Car owner would need
to opt in to have certain information collected by the
manufacturer.59 Thus far, their calls have fallen on deaf ears.60

52 United States v. Dantzler, No. 3:10-cr-00024, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68753, at 1
(W.D. La. June 16, 2010), report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:10-cr-00024, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 68483 (W.D. La. July 8, 2010).
53 Id. Since police obtained a warrant prior to searching the vehicle, this scenario did
not pose a Fourth Amendment issue. Also, the police did not possess the car that held the
data; instead they went to OnStar to get the data. Unlike this case, the scenario posed in
this Note’s Introduction did not involve a third party.
54 John R. Quain, Changes to OnStar’s Privacy Terms Rile Some Users, N.Y. TIMES:
WHEELS (Sept. 22, 2011, 6:00 AM), http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/22/changes-toonstars-privacy-terms-rile-some-users/.
55 See Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy Policy Is,
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER
(Dec.
4,
2014),
http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/12/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is/ (stating “Some
52% of internet users believe – incorrectly – that [the company keeps confidential all the
information it collects on users] and that privacy policies actually ensure the confidentiality
of their personal information.”).
56 See PAUL BERNAL, INTERNET PRIVACY RIGHTS: RIGHTS TO PROTECT AUTONOMY 36-38
(Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2014).
57 Markey, supra note 31, at 12.
58 See id.
59 Id.
60 See id.
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It is important to understand that consent to the collection of
Car data is distinct from consent to the sharing of the Car data
with law enforcement. Car owners do not cede their Fourth
Amendment rights by agreeing to these privacy statements. The
rest of this Note deals with Fourth Amendment questions involved
with Connected Cars.
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment provides that:
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.61
A “search” occurs when a law-enforcement officer examines a
person’s body, property, or another area that the person would
reasonably expect to consider private “for the purpose of finding
evidence of a crime.”62 A warrantless search conducted by a lawenforcement officer is per se unreasonable,63 but the Supreme
Court has carved out several exceptions to this rule that do not
require a warrant prior to a search.64 One of these exceptions is
the automobile exception.
Part II-A will trace the historical development of the automobile
exception to the Fourth Amendment, which generally permits law61 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
62 Search, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see United States v. Jacobsen, 466

U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
63 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). In Katz, the Court noted that
“searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment…” In general, evidence
obtained by law-enforcement officers as a result of an unreasonable search will be
suppressed. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55 (1961).
64 See, e.g., Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (discussing the
automobile exception); Benjamin Holley, Digitizing the Fourth Amendment: Limiting the
Private Search Exception in Computer Investigations, 96 VA. L. REV. 677, 677-78 (2010)
(discussing the private search exception, which permits government agents, without a
warrant, to recreate the search done by the private party so long as they do not exceed the
scope of the private search). For more discussion about the exceptions to the warrant
requirement, see Akhil R. Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV.
757 (1994).
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enforcement officers to conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle.
Part II-B will discuss how the Supreme Court has applied the
Fourth Amendment to pre-Internet technologies. Part II-C will
discuss two recent Fourth Amendment Supreme Court cases,
United States v. Jones65 and Riley v. California,66 that involve a
Global Positioning System (GPS) tracking device and a cell phone,
respectively.
A. Lesser Expectation of Privacy in Vehicles
The IoT encompasses many devices. For Connected Cars, the
Supreme Court has already developed particular rules concerning
the Fourth Amendment. If a law-enforcement officer has probable
cause to believe that a vehicle contains contraband, he or she has
the constitutional authority to search it immediately; a warrant is
not required for the search.67
Since 1925, the Supreme Court has subjected vehicles to lesser
Fourth Amendment protection because of their inherent mobility
and their ability to be used for transportation;68 the lesser
expectation of privacy in vehicles is the reason why warrantless
searches of vehicles are permissible. This automobile exception
was first set forth in the landmark Supreme Court case, Carroll v.
United States.69 There, law-enforcement officers suspected that
the defendants were transporting illegal goods in their vehicle.70
As a result, the officers pulled over the defendants, searched their
car without a warrant, and found illegal goods hidden underneath
the seat cushions.71 Carroll distinguished a vehicle search from a
search of a building because “the vehicle can be quickly moved out
of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought;”72 as a result, taking the time to secure a warrant may be

65
66
67
68

565 U.S. 400 (2012).
134 S.Ct. 2473 (2014)
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925).
California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1985). Under the automobile exception,
the term “vehicle” includes airplanes, boats, and, under certain circumstances, mobile
homes. See, e.g., id. (motor homes); United States v. Bellina, 665 F.2d 1335, 1341 (4th Cir.
1981) (airplanes); United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1125 (1st Cir. 1978) (boats).
69 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
70 Id. at 153.
71 Id. at 136.
72 Id. at 153.
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impracticable.73 The Court held that the warrantless search of a
vehicle did not violate the Fourth Amendment,74 and the Court
established that concealed contraband75 goods located within a
vehicle were not subject to Fourth Amendment protection.76
Carroll’s automobile exception was later applied to vehicles that
were moved by police from the site of the stop. In Chambers v.
Maroney,77 police officers stopped a vehicle that matched the
description of the getaway vehicle used in a gas-station robbery.78
Both occupants were arrested, and the officers took the car to the
police station to search it.79 The warrantless search at the police
station returned two .38-caliber revolvers and numerous items
that belonged to the robbery victim.80 The court held that probable
cause existed to conduct the warrantless vehicle search at the
police station, despite no risk that the vehicle would move out of
police jurisdiction during the time it would take to secure a
warrant.81 The court also found that the officers would still have
probable cause to believe that the robbery vehicle contained
contraband and, thus, did not need a warrant regardless of the
time lapse between the original vehicle stop and the vehicle
search.82 As long as probable cause exists, an officer is permitted
to either conduct an immediate warrantless search of the vehicle,
or even search the vehicle at a later time by seizing it and
“presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate.”83 Early on,

73 Id. at 153.
74 Id. at 156.
75 In this Note, “contraband” is defined as any item, prohibited by statute, that is

subject to seizure and forfeiture by a designated governmental actor. See, e.g., id. at 14953.
76 Id. at 155.
77 399 U.S. 42, 44 (1970).
78 Id. at 44.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 52.
82 Id. at 48, 52. Officer safety may have also played a role in the Court’s decision. See
id. at 52 n.10 (noting that “[i]t was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to the
station house. All occupants in the car were arrested in a dark parking lot in the middle of
the night. A careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps not safe for the
officers.”).
83 Id.

BROWN - MACRO.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

FOURTH AMENDMENT AND CONNECTED CARS

2/6/19 4:32 PM

323

then, the Court did not delineate an outer temporal border for the
automobile exception.84
The Court later placed limitations on the automobile exception
in Coolidge v. New Hampshire.85 In Coolidge, the defendant was
questioned by the police at his house in connection with a
murder.86 Three weeks after the initial police visit and after the
police: (1) conducted a lie detector test on the defendant, (2) visited
the defendant’s house a second time, and (3) collected other
evidence from the defendant’s wife, the defendant was arrested at
his house.87 The police then searched the defendant’s vehicle,
which was located in the driveway adjacent to his house, and found
evidence linking the defendant to the murder.88 Still, plurality
rejected the State’s use of the automobile exception to justify the
search of the defendant’s vehicle.89 Although the police had
probable cause to search the defendant’s vehicle, the plurality
found that it was not impracticable to obtain a search warrant; in
fact, they had “ample opportunity”90 to do so. Distinguishing
Carroll and Chambers, the plurality emphasized that the items in
the defendant’s car were not contraband91 and that the
opportunity to search the defendant’s vehicle was not “fleeting.”92
As a result, “the application of the Carroll case to [Coolidge’s] facts
would extend it far beyond its original rationale.”93 With this
84 See id. at 51 (noting that the warrantless vehicle search “must be made immediately
without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held without a warrant for whatever
period is necessary to obtain a warrant for the search”) (emphasis added).
85 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971) (plurality opinion), abrogated on other grounds by Horton
v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
86 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 445.
87 Id. at 446-47. The second police visit to the defendant’s home was done by a different
pair of officers, and they were unaware of the first visit made by the other officers. Id. at
446.
88 Id. at 447-49. The police obtained a search warrant for the defendant’s vehicle, but
the plurality invalidated the warrant since it was not obtained by a “neutral and detached
magistrate [as] required by the Constitution.” Id. at 449. As a result, the State sought, inter
alia, to invoke the automobile exception. Id. at 458.
89 Id. at 462.
90 Id. The plurality found no evidence that would permit the use of the automobile
exception. Id. (noting there was “no alerted criminal bent on flight, no fleeting opportunity
on an open highway after a hazardous chase, no contraband or stolen goods or weapons, no
confederates waiting to move the evidence, not even the inconvenience of a special police
detail to guard the immobilized automobile.”).
91 For the definition of “contraband,” see supra note 75.
92 Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 460-62.
93 Id. at 458.
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decision, the Court prohibited the use of the automobile exception
in situations where “no exigent circumstances” existed.94 The
Court also emphasized that “[t]he word ‘automobile’ is not a
talisman in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away
and disappears.”95 Today, due to advances in technology that allow
warrants to be obtained quicker,96 there are more instances where
police would have “ample opportunity”97 to obtain a warrant.
Despite Coolidge’s limitation on the automobile exception, the
Court continued to extend warrantless searches in several
physical areas within a vehicle, including the glove
compartment,98 center console,99 trunk,100 and any containers
within the interior or trunk of the car.101 Today, advances in
technology have made it even quicker to obtain search
warrants.102
B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Technology in the PreInternet Era
Before the Internet, automobiles were an early example of how
the Supreme Court applied the Fourth Amendment to new
technologies. Advances in technology have continued to create
new challenges for our legal framework.103 The Fourth
94
95
96
97
98

See id. at 464.
Id. at 461.
See infra Part III-B.
Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 472.
New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981) (holding that police, incident to arrest,
may search the glove compartment of the occupant’s car). But see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 343 (2009) (holding that police may search the glove compartment of the occupant’s
car “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger
compartment at the time of the search”).
99 Under Belton, the center console would be subject to a warrantless search because it
within the reach of the driver. See Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4.
100 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982) (holding that police may search the
trunk of the occupant’s car if they have probable cause to believe it contains contraband).
101 See id. (authorizing warrantless searches of containers in the trunk of the car); see
also Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n.4 (authorizing warrantless searches of containers within the
interior of the car).
102 For further discussion on the ease of obtaining a warrant today, see infra Part IIIB.
103 See Susan W. Brenner, The Fourth Amendment in an Era of Ubiquitous Technology,
75 MISS. L.J. 1, 78-79 (2005) (opining that “[w]e are now approaching a critical set of [Fourth
Amendment] issues—the effects of technology of an unparalleled sophistication on our
privacy”); see also, e.g., Ferguson, supra note 14, at 825 (arguing “The Fourth Amendment,
of course, did not envision the Internet of Things. In a pre-electricity, pre-telephone era, the
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Amendment protects only those areas and spaces to which the
Supreme Court ascribes reasonable expectations of privacy and
developing technology naturally impacts society’s reasonable
expectations of privacy.104 An expectation of privacy is reasonable
when an individual exhibits a subjective expectation of privacy
and that expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared to
accept as reasonable.105 As the Court recognizes, the reasonable
expectation of privacy continues to change as technology changes
over time.106
Originally, in Olmstead v. United States,107 technology led to a
lesser expectation of privacy.108 In this 1928 Supreme Court case,
the defendant was suspected of selling illegal goods,109 so federal
officers installed wiretaps in the basement of the defendant’s
building.110 The wiretaps were installed without trespassing onto
the defendant’s property and were used to listen to his telephone
conversations.111 Later, the officers intercepted incriminating
evidence from the wiretap, and the officers arrested the
defendant.112 The Court held that the wiretap was not a search
under the Fourth Amendment.113 Relying on dicta in Carroll, the
Court indicated that the Fourth Amendment only protects against
a physical search of constitutionally protected areas: one’s person,
papers, home, or “tangible material effects.”114 Since telephone
idea that things (or even people) could communicate wirelessly, instantaneously, and
automatically did not enter into the calculation of drafting fundamental protections.”). This
problem is compounded when judges are unfamiliar with the basic knowledge of how
certain technology works. See, e.g., Ashby Jones, Our Tech-Savvy Supreme Court, WALL ST.
J.: L. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2010, 5:56 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/04/19/our-tech-savvysupreme-court.
104 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 – 61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
105 Id. at 361.
106 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (Alito, J., concurring).
107 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
108 See id. at 466 (noting that electronic wiretapping is permissible since there was no
“actual physical invasion” of the individual’s Constitutionally protected areas) (emphasis
added).
109 The defendant was accused of importing, possessing, and selling alcohol, which was
illegal at this time. Id. at 455; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI.
110 Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 456-57.
111 Id. at 457.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 466.
114 Id. at 465-66 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (noting that
“[t]he Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an
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conversations are intangible and not physical in nature, they were
not protected under the Fourth Amendment.115
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead criticized the majority’s
strict reliance on the original text of the Fourth Amendment.116
Brandeis recognized that the language of the Fourth Amendment
should not be construed to apply solely to its original enacted
purposes.117 Furthermore, Brandeis had the foresight to recognize
that advances in technology would provide the government with
more non-physical ways to seize information, which would create
even greater privacy concerns.118 In other words, as technology
continues to develop and become more sophisticated, the
government’s surveillance capabilities will advance beyond
physical interventions, so a literal understanding of the Fourth
Amendment will diminish an individual’s expectation of privacy
over time. As a result, a broader, non-physical understanding of
the Fourth Amendment is necessary to establish a proper balance
between law enforcement interests and individual interests when
construing the Fourth Amendment.119
In line with Justice Brandeis’s dissent, the Court later overruled
Olmstead in the seminal case, Katz v. United States.120 In Katz,
the government placed a voice recording device on top of a public
payphone that the defendant regularly used to conduct illegal
activity over telephone conversations.121 The defendant was later
arrested, and the recorded telephone conversations were admitted
into evidence.122 The Court held that the government’s use of the
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will conserve
public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens.”)).
115 Id. at 466.
116 See id. at 472 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
117 Id. at 473.
118 See id. at 474 (opining that “[w]ays may some day be developed by which the
Government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can reproduce them in court,
and by which it will be enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home.”). Brandeis’s prediction ultimately proved correct. See Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the government’s use of a thermal imaging device outside
of a person’s home to record heat being emitted from inside the home was a “search” under
the Fourth Amendment).
119 See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819) (“[W]e must never forget, that
it is a constitution we are expounding.”).
120 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
121 Id. at 348. The defendant was accused of transmitting information to facilitate
gambling, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1994). Id.
122 Id. at 348-49. Since “there was no physical entrance into the area occupied by [the
defendant],” the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision to admit
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recording device was a “search” under the Fourth Amendment.123
From the outset, the Court rejected the notion that Fourth
Amendment searches only apply to physical searches of
constitutionally protected areas, thereby overruling the core
holding of Olmstead.124 The Court emphasized that “the Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places.”125 The Court went on to
distinguish protected activity from activity not protected under
the Fourth Amendment: “What a person knowingly exposes to the
public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve as private,
even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.”126 Here, the defendant’s use of the public telephone
booth was protected activity because the defendant expected the
content of his conversations to remain private.127 Since the
government’s search “violated the privacy upon which [the
defendant] justifiably relied while using the telephone booth,” the
government should have obtained a warrant to conduct this
search.128
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz expanded on the majority’s
argument by proposing a two-prong test for whether a person has
a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”129 The first prong asks
whether, depending on the facts and circumstances, the individual
exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy.130 The second prong
asks whether that expectation of privacy is one that society is
prepared to accept as reasonable; this involves an objective
analysis.131 Harlan’s subjective-objective standard was later
adopted by the Court to determine whether a particular
the telephone conversations into evidence. Katz v. United States, 369 F.2d 130, 134 (9th
Cir. 1966), rev’d, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
123 Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 351.
126 Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This distinction echoes Justice Brandeis’s
assertion that an individual’s expectation of privacy will change along with developing
technology. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472-74 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New
York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
127 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
128 Id.
129 Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
130 Id.
131 Id.
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governmental investigative technique constituted a Fourth
Amendment search132 and Katz continued to be the guidepost for
a long time in the Fourth Amendment framework.133
C. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy: Technology in the PostInternet Era
Even within this Katz framework, the rise of the Internet and
continued development of technology have created a new host of
Fourth Amendment issues.134 The Framers did not envision
devices that could instantly pinpoint one’s location and contain
massive troves of data, yet still be able to fit in the palm of your
hand.135 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recently confronted the
challenge of applying the Fourth Amendment to two post-Internet
technologies: a GPS tracking device in United States v. Jones
(2012) and a cell phone in Riley v. California (2014).136 In these
cases, the Court expounded upon the subjective-objective test for
the reasonable expectation of privacy and provided more guidance
on its application to these new technologies.137
Jones addressed whether “the attachment of a GlobalPositioning-System (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s
vehicle, and subsequent use of that device to monitor the vehicle’s
movements on public streets, constitutes a search or seizure
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”138 There, the
government placed a GPS tracking device underneath the
defendant’s car and used the GPS to monitor the vehicle’s
movement for twenty-eight days.139 Despite holding that the
government’s installation of the GPS device was a “search” under
the Fourth Amendment,140 the Court deviated from the
132 See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739-41 (1979) (applying the Katz analysis
as detailed by Justice Harlan).
133 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
134 See Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1322 (2002).
135 Id.
136 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473
(2014).
137 See generally Jones, 565 U.S. at 409; Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493.
138 Jones, 565 U.S. at 403.
139 Id. During those twenty-eight days, the GPS tracking device transmitted over 2,000
pages of data. Id.
140 Id. at 404.
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“reasonable expectation of privacy” test articulated in Katz in
favor of the traditional, property-based approach from
Olmstead.141 In the majority opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized
the physical intrusion of the defendant’s car and how the intrusion
fit within the original scope of the Fourth Amendment.142
Although Justice Scalia acknowledged that recent cases deviated
from Olmstead’s property-based approach, Scalia insisted that
Katz did not eliminate the Olmstead approach;143 in fact, Scalia
noted that the reasonable expectation of privacy test “has been
added to, not substituted for,”144 the Olmstead approach. Thus,
after Jones, there is now a three-prong test used to determine
whether a particular governmental investigative technique has
violated the Fourth Amendment: (1) the technique must be a
physical trespass upon a constitutionally protected area; (2) the
trespass must be done to obtain information; and (3) the Katz
reasonable expectation of privacy test must be satisfied.145
In separate concurrences in Jones, Justices Alito and Sotomayor
both agreed that GPS tracking can reveal intricate details about a
person.146 Justice Sotomayor observed that advances in
technology will generate more nonphysical modes of surveillance,
which would render the trespassory test less useful, but
“[s]ituations involving merely the transmission of electronic
signals without trespass would remain subject to Katz
analysis.”147 As a result, Sotomayor believed that both long-term
141 Id. at 405-07.
142 Id. at 404-05. This rationale was used to buttress the plurality’s arguments in

Olmstead, so it is difficult to argue that this is not a return to the Olmstead approach. See
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465-66 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 80 (1967).
143 But see Ferguson, supra note 14, at 831 n.161. Ferguson notes that the Court’s
“assertion belies the history and general discussion of the issue, which has long left the
Olmstead line of cases in the graveyard of Fourth Amendment history.” Scholars have
questioned whether the Court’s return to Olmstead was justified. See, e.g., Erin Murphy,
Back to the Future: The Curious Case of United States v. Jones, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.32526, 340 (2012); Thomas K Clancy, United States v. Jones: Fourth Amendment Applicability
in the 21st Century, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 303, 322-23 (2012).
144 Jones, 565 U.S. at 409 (emphasis omitted).
145 See id. at 407-08 n.5.
146 Compare id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring) with id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)
(“In cases involving even short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS
surveillance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular attention.”).
147 Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). This can occur when the government is given
remote access to “factory- or owner-installed vehicle tracking devices or GPS-enabled
smartphones.” Id.
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and short-term GPS monitoring might impinge on reasonable
expectations of privacy.148 Similarly, Justice Alito believed that
only long-term GPS monitoring may impinge on reasonable
expectations of privacy, but short-term GPS monitoring probably
would not.149 Neither Sotomayor nor Alito delineated when exactly
long-term GPS tracking of a vehicle would commence, but Alito
found that “the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”150
Soon after Jones, the Supreme Court addressed the privacy
interests implicated in one of the most pervasive forms of
technology today—the cell phone.151 In Riley v. California, the
Court decided whether a warrantless search of digital data on a
cell phone is permissible under the Fourth Amendment.152 In two
separate incidents, police officers recovered a cell phone following
a search incident to arrest.153 Through the normal operation of
each cell phone, the officers accessed incriminating information by
reviewing call records, pictures, and videos on each phone without
148 Id. at 417. Justice Sotomayor also discussed the third-party doctrine – the idea that
an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily
shared with third parties. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979); United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). Sotomayor argued that the doctrine “is ill suited to the
digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” Jones, 565 U.S. at 417. The thirdparty doctrine is at issue in a pending Supreme Court case – Carpenter v. United States,
138 S. Ct. 2206, 2220 (2018) – where law-enforcement officials obtained 127 days’ worth of
the defendant’s cell phone records from their cell phone company. These records contained
the location and movements of the defendant’s cell phone, which was used to connect the
defendant to a robbery in that area. This Note will not be eclipsed by Carpenter’s outcome.
Unlike the scenario in this Note’s introduction, the law-enforcement officials in Carpenter
worked with the holder of the data to obtain the data. See supra Introduction. Also, law
enforcement in Carpenter relied on the Stored Communications Act, which allows phone
companies to share phone records when the government provides “specific and articulable
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that the records sought “are
relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.” 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2016).
149 Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring).
150 Id.
151 Cell-phone ownership in the United States is staggering. In 2015, more than 92%
of adults owned a mobile phone of some kind, including smartphones. Among adults ages
18-29, this figure rises to 98%. See Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015,
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER
(Oct.
29,
2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/.
152 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2480 (2014). Riley focuses on searches incident
to arrest, but the implications of its reasoning reach far beyond this narrower issue. See id.
at 2485. Even though Riley addressed the retention of the warrant requirement for cell
phone searches, courts have relied on Riley to apply other Fourth Amendment doctrines to
cell phones. See, e.g., United States v. Sparks, 806 F.3d 1323, 1336 (11th Cir. 2015) (relying
on Riley to apply the Fourth Amendment private search exception to cell phones).
153 Id. at 2480-81. In a consolidated opinion, both David Riley and Brima Wurie had
their cell phones taken from their person. Id.
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obtaining warrants.154 The Court held that police officers must
obtain a warrant before searching the digital information located
on a cell phone.155 In reaching its holding, the Court differentiated
physical objects from digital content on a cell phone.156 For
example, to ensure officer safety, police officers may conduct a
warrantless search of a suspect incident to arrest.157 As a result,
the officers could search the physical parts of a cell phone to ensure
there are no concealed razor blades within.158 However, the Court
noted that cell-phone data presented no threat to officer safety.159
In Riley, the Court emphasized that a search of digital
information on a cell phone implicates greater individual privacy
interests than a physical search.160 Cell phones implicate greater
privacy interests due to their large storage capacity, the variety of
information they can store, and the possibility that a search may
extend beyond the data on the phone itself.161 As the Court
indicated, “A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper
reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he would not carry a record of all
his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months,
as would routinely be kept on a [cell] phone.”162
The Court’s emphasis on these three factors suggest that any
device with similar capabilities to a cell phone would be subject to
a warrant requirement.163 The Court did not need to predict what
154 Id. at 2480-81. Riley had a smartphone, which has a wide range of features and
large storage capacity, while Wurie had a flip phone, which generally has less features than
a smartphone. Id. Neither cell phone was password protected. Id.
155 Id. at 2485. The Court refused to extend the “search incident to arrest” exception to
cell phones, which generally allows police officers to search an arrestee in order to preserve
evidence or ensure the safety of the officer. Id.; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 76364 (1969).
156 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484. By making this distinction, the Court was able to avoid
adhering to the precedent in its previous “search incident to arrest” cases. See id. at 248485.
157 See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 764.
158 See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234-35 (1973). In Robinson, the Court
found that an officer could conduct a search incident to arrest because the “danger to an
officer is far greater in the case of the extended exposure which follows the taking of a
suspect into custody and transporting him to the police station.” Id.
159 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485 (stating “Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself
be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape.”).
160 Id. at 2488-89 (noting that “[m]odern cell phones, as a category, implicate privacy
concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse”).
161 See id. at 2489-91.
162 Id. at 2489.
163 Ferguson, supra note 14, at 834 (noting “While Riley addressed the existing
technologies of smartphones in 2014, the broader conclusions apply to any smart device
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other devices may be analogized to a cell phone; however, with
Connected Cars entering the marketplace, the privacy interests
implicated in IoT devices must be explored.
III. SAFEGUARDING OUR PRIVACY: THE NEED FOR A WARRANT
REQUIREMENT
To protect the privacy interests of Connected Car users, the
Supreme Court should extend the rationales of the Riley case and
require law enforcement officials to obtain a warrant before
searching any data on a Connected Car. As previously discussed,
cell phone searches implicate greater individual privacy
interests.164 Since Connected Cars share many cell-phone
attributes, Connected Cars should also implicate greater
individual privacy interests. In comparing a cell phone with a
Connected Car, the three-prong Jones test is useful.
A. Jones Applied to Connected Cars
Applying the three-prong Jones test to a Connected Car
illustrates its similarity to a cell phone.165 First, in the
Introduction scenario,166 the police officer conducted a physical
trespass on the Car. The officer conducted a physical search by
searching the interior of the Car and using the head-unit
touchscreen to search the electronic data on the Car. This
situation appears to combine the searches conducted in Carroll 167
and Riley.168 Assuming the officer reasonably believed there was
marihuana inside the vehicle, the physical search would be

that can track, collect, share, store, and process personal data about its owner.”); see Riley,
134 S. Ct. at 2489 (arguing “The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading shorthand; many of
these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to be used as
a telephone.”).
164 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
165 In applying the Jones test, consider the scenario detailed in the Introduction of this
Note. See supra Introduction.
166 Id.
167 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 135 (1925). In Carroll, law-enforcement
officers suspected that the defendants were transporting illegal goods in their vehicle,
pulled over the car and searched it without a warrant; they found illegal goods under the
seat cushions.
168 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2480-81. In Riley, the police officer obtained the defendants’
respective cell phones and searched them.
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permissible under Carroll.169 Warrantless access to digital records
is precisely what the Riley Court sought to avoid.170
Second, the physical trespass was done to obtain information.
The officer looked for evidence of marihuana in the interior and
trunk of the Car, and she looked on the Car’s head unit to find any
evidence of marihuana activity.
The third prong of the Jones test is the reasonable expectation
of privacy test from Katz. As previously stated, the two-pronged
reasonable expectation of privacy test first asks whether the
individual exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy, and then
whether that expectation of privacy is one that society is prepared
to accept as reasonable.171 Each of these two prongs will be
addressed in turn. For the first prong, the Car driver exhibited a
subjective expectation of privacy by not consenting to a search of
her vehicle, which included the electronic data. In this instance,
lack of consent may be the only way to prove that the driver
maintained a subjective expectation of privacy in her vehicle.172
Applying the second prong of the reasonable expectation of
privacy test, which involves an objective analysis of the analogy
between a Connected Car and a cell phone, presents challenges.
On one hand, the Connected Car is a vehicle, which is normally
subject to a lesser expectation of privacy.173 On the other hand,
with all the data they contain and can reveal, Connected Cars hold
“the privacies of life” and should implicate greater privacy
interests.174 In his concurrence in Riley, Justice Alito advocated
for a revised balancing of law enforcement interests and privacy
interests due to changes in technology,175 and he urged Congress
or state legislatures to delineate “reasonable distinctions based on
categories of information or perhaps other variables.”176

169 Marihuana is classified as a Schedule I drug under federal law, which would make
it contraband. See 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11(d)(23) (2016); see also supra note 75 (defining
“contraband”).
170 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
171 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
172 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413-14 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
173 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-56 (1925).
174 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2495.
175 Id. at 2496-97 (Alito, J., concurring). Alito agreed with the majority that pre-digital
precedent from previous “search incident to arrest” cases should not be mechanically
applied to a cell phone search. Id. at 2496.
176 Id. at 2497.
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The Riley majority delineated three potential variables in
finding that cell phones implicate greater privacy interests: their
large storage capacity, the variety of information they can store,
and the possibility that a search may extend beyond the data on
the phone itself.177 These three variables are applicable to
Connected Cars.
Firstly, Connected Cars have a large storage capacity.
Connected Cars can store the data they collect on the Car onto a
special hard drive;178 these hard drives typically hold between 100
gigabytes and 320 gigabytes of data.179 This is a massive amount
of storage capacity. For comparison, a mere sixteen gigabytes can
store “millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds
of videos” on a cell phone.180 Along with cell phones, Connected
Car storage capacity will only continue to increase in the future.181
Secondly, Connected Cars store a wide variety of information.
Aside from operational data, potential crash events, and other
types of information detailed in Part I, Connected Cars also record
geographical location through GPS tracking.182 Connected Cars
and cell phones both contain GPS tracking capabilities.183 If a lawenforcement officer were able to search through the historical
location information on the Car, the officer would be able to
reconstruct the inconspicuous intimate details of the Car owner’s
life, which is normally far beyond the scope of any police search.184
As Justice Sotomayor noted in Jones, both short-term and longterm “GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record
of a person’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail
about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations.”185

177
178
179
180

See id. at 2489-91.
See supra Part I.
See Toshiba, supra note 39.
See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413-14
(2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
181 See Orin S. Kerr, Privacy, Security, and Human Dignity in the Digital Age:
Foreword: Accounting for Technological Change, 36 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 403, 404-05
(2013).
182 See supra Part I.
183 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490; Habeck et al., supra note 34, at 14.
184 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415-18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
185 Id.
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Thirdly, a data search on a Connected Car might extend beyond
the data on the Car itself. This is especially true with cell phone
integration.186 Through Apple CarPlay and Android Auto, Car
owners have direct and indirect access to the data stored on their
phone.187 In the Introduction scenario, the officer’s search went
beyond the data on the Car when she used the Car’s head unit to
access text messages and call records that were located on the cell
phone.188 Additionally, to retrieve vehicle data from a Connected
Car system like OnStar, OnStar requires law enforcement officials
to obtain a warrant anyway.189 Thus, the three Riley variables
have been satisfied, and the second prong of the reasonable
expectation of privacy test has been met. As a result, Connected
Cars should implicate greater privacy interests, and a warrant
requirement would protect these interests.
With a warrant requirement in place for digital data on
Connected Cars, the officer’s warrantless search in the
Introduction scenario would have ceased once the officer finished
searching the interior of the Car. Aside from the three variables
from Riley, consider the original reason for the automobile
exception in Carroll: to find contraband.190 In the Introduction
scenario, the contraband sought by the officer was marihuana.
Once the officer found nothing in the physical vehicle, the
warrantless search should have ceased. Instead, the officer began
to search through the Car’s digital data. It cannot be argued that
the officer continued to search for the contraband marihuana on
the Car’s head unit data, so the warrantless search should not
have extended into the Car’s head unit.
B. Opposing the Warrant Requirement
1. Impact on Law Enforcement
It is conceded that the warrant requirement for data on
Connected Cars will impact how police officers do their jobs.191
186
187
188
189
190
191

See supra Part I.
See id.
See supra Introduction.
See Privacy Statement, supra note 47; supra Part I.
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 155-156 (1925).
The Riley Court anticipated the same with cell phones. See Riley v. California, 134
S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014).
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Cell phones can provide valuable information to help prosecute
criminals.192 A warrant requirement could also deter officers from
pursuing low-level offenders. Nonetheless, individual rights
cannot be sacrificed for the sake of officer convenience, so
“[p]rivacy comes at a cost.”193
To reiterate, my proposal for a warrant requirement does not
prevent police officers from searching the physical vehicle under
circumstances that warrant it. My purpose is to simply require
officers to obtain warrants before searching digital data on a
Connected Car.194
Under Coolidge, police may still justify a warrantless search of
data on a Connected Car if exigent circumstances exist;195 this
could include preventing the imminent destruction of evidence and
rendering emergency assistance to people who are injured or
threatened with imminent injury.196 For example, in the
Introduction scenario, if the text message from Rott actually said
“5 IEDs, that should do the trick,” then the officer would be
permitted to check the trunk in order to protect herself and those
around her.
Also, several states now have judges on-call 24/7 to sign
warrants.197 Judge Dale O. Harris, a Minnesota state court judge,
is one of the many judges that sign warrants outside working
hours.198 The officer would bring the completed warrant and
affidavit of support to the judge’s location for the judge to sign,
even if it was a holiday, outside of work hours, or the judge was at
his home.199 Interestingly, Judge Harris noted that many of the
warrants he currently signs involve searches of cell phones and

192
193
194
195

Id.
Id.
See id.
See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464 (1971) (plurality opinion),
abrogated on other grounds by Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990).
196 See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011).
197 See, e.g., Dale Harris, A Judge’s View: Warrants Can’t Wait, So a Judge Always is
On
Call,
DULUTH
NEWS
TRIBUNE
(Jan.
6,
2016,
3:13
PM),
http://www.duluthnewstribune.com/opinion/3918552-judges-view-warrants-cant-wait-sojudge-always-call; Sarah Mervosh, Dallas County Judges On Call 24/7 to Sign Warrants,
DALLAS NEWS (Dec. 25, 2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/news/2015/12/25/dallascounty-judges-on-call-247-to-sign-warrants.
198 Id.
199 Harris, supra note 197.
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computers.200 According to Judge Brandon Birmingham, a state
court judge in Texas, reading through the affidavit and signing the
warrant only takes about fifteen minutes.201
Today, recent technological advances have made it easier to
obtain a warrant. More than thirty states currently allow
electronic warrant applications in various forms, including
“telephonic or radio communication, electronic communication
such as e-mail, and video conferencing.”202 For example, in one
county in Kansas, “[P]olice officers can e-mail warrant requests to
judges’ iPads; judges have signed such warrants and e-mailed
them back to officers in less than 15 minutes.”203 Federal
magistrate judges can also issue warrants based on “information
communicated by telephone or other reliable electronic means.”204
While this may not be a perfect solution, individual privacy
interests cannot be sacrificed merely for the sake of police
convenience.205 Instead, law enforcement must work with
technology to meet the strict mandates of the Constitution.206 By
discouraging law enforcement from embarking on fishing
expeditions for evidence based on post-hoc rationalizations, an
appropriate safeguard will be in place to protect the car-owner’s
privacy interests.
2. “Overprotection” for Connected Cars
Some may argue that this warrant requirement favors
protection of Connected Cars over traditional automobiles. In his
concurrence in Riley, Justice Alito suggested that the warrant
requirement for cell phones would protect digital data in instances
where hard-copy information would not be protected.207
Accordingly, digital data found on a Connected Car might be
200
201
202
203
204
205

Id.
Mervosh, supra note 197.
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 154 (2013); see id. at 154 n.4.
Id. at 173 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2504 (2016).
FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1(a).
See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (noting “Our cases have
historically recognized that the warrant requirement is an important working part of our
machinery of government, not merely an inconvenience to be somehow weighed against the
claims of police efficiency.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
206 See id. at 2495 (arguing “The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry
such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the
protection for which the founders fought.”).
207 See id. at 2497 (Alito, J., concurring).
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protected in instances where it would not be protected in a
traditional automobile.
Nonetheless, Justice Alito noted that there was no other
“workable alternative,” and this is also the case for Connected
Cars.208 Firstly, police officers need clear rules to determine how
to do their jobs. Alito opined that it would take “many years for
the courts to develop more nuanced rules” about searching a cell
phone;209 I anticipate the same with Connected Cars. In the
interim, officers need to know how to approach a Connected Car
search so that the evidence obtained is not suppressed later on. In
fact, with reference to my Introduction scenario, a New York
Assistant District Attorney opined that the marijuana recovered
by the officer would very likely be suppressed.210 Lastly, this
counterargument ignores the greater privacy interests afforded to
digital data on Connected Cars. As discussed earlier, constant
technology changes allow the collection and storage of digital data
on Connected Cars.211 Also, this Connected Car warrant
requirement categorically protects all data on the Car rather than
favoring some types of data over others, which is in line with
Riley’s categorical protection of digital data on cell phones.212 As a
result, this warrant requirement helps to maintain the balance
between individual rights and police power.
IV. CONCLUSION
To protect the privacy interests of Connected Car owners, the
Supreme Court should adopt a warrant requirement for the digital
data on a Connected Car. This proposed warrant requirement
gives the Court a framework to apply the Fourth Amendment to
current and future IoT technologies. The warrant requirement
also serves to maintain the balance of police power with the
privacy interests of individuals. Riley already requires a warrant
for cell-phone searches, so this warrant requirement merely
208
209
210
211
212

Id.
Id.
Telephone Interview with Assistant District Attorney, supra note 28.
See supra Part I.
Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2176-77 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the Riley Court adopted a categorical approach
by requiring a warrant for a search of any and all cell phone data).
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provides the corollary for Connected Cars and other emerging IoT
technologies.
This proposed warrant requirement should not be limited to
Connected Cars; it is merely a starting point in the Fourth
Amendment/IoT conversation. IoT technology will unquestionably
continue to develop and pervade our everyday lives; Google
Glasses, Virtual Reality headsets, and microchip implants will
soon become commonplace. This pervasiveness permits intimate
details of one’s life to be aggregated in ways that have never been
possible.
The Fourth Amendment has withstood the test of time, and it
will also be a guide through this next chapter of progress.
Requiring a warrant is the path that best protects the rights of
individuals from over-encroachment by the government.

